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et al.: Separation of Powers

SEPARATION OF POWERS
N.Y. CONST. art. ll, § 1:
The legislativepowers of this state shall be vested in the senate
and assembly.
N.Y CoNsT. art. IV, § 1:
The executive power shall be vested in the governor ....
COURT OF APPEALS
Bourquin v. Cuomo1
(decided June 13, 1995)
Pierre Bourquin, John Faso and Glenn H. Harris, along with
the nonprofit corporations, Citizens for a Sound Economy, Inc.
and Atlantic Legal Foundation, Inc., brought an action against
both the Department of Public Service of the State of New York
and then-governor Mario Cuomo, alleging that the issuance of
Executive Order No. 1412 was unconstitutional. 3 They contended
that the Order was issued in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. 4 Executive Order No. 141 (hereinafter Executive
Order) authorized the "creation of a private, not-for-profit
corporation known as the Citizen's Utility Board (hereinafter
CUB) intended, among other things, to represent the interests of
residential utility customers in ratemaking and other proceedings
before the Public Service Commission. " 5 Shortly after the
Executive Order was promulgated, Bourquin, asserting standing
as a "citizen, resident and taxpayer,"6 argued that the Order
1. 85 N.Y.2d 781, 652 N.E.2d 171, 628 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1995).
2. N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4.141 (1995).

3. Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 784, 652 N.E.2d at 172, 628 N.Y.S.2d at
619.

4. Id.
5. Id. at 783, 652 N.E.2d at 172, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 619. It also provided

that the Board would have access to no more than four state agency mailings
per year. Id.
6. Id.
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violated Article III, section 17 and Article IV, section 18 of the

New York State Constitution and sought a preliminary injunction
to enjoin the execution of the Order. 9 The court rejected
Plaintiffs' claims and found that defendants had "acted within
their respective constitutional and statutory authority."10 The
appellate division reversed the supreme court's dismissal of the

action and found that the Executive Order was an unconstitutional
usurption of legislative authority. 11 The court of appeals reversed
the determination of the appellate division and held that the

governor did not exceed his authority in issuing the Executive
Order and that such action did not violate the state constitutional

principle of separation of powers. 12

The court cited to both Clark v. Cuomo 13 and Matter of New
York State Health Facilities Assn. v. Axelrod 14 for the
7. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1. This section provides in pertinent part:
"The legislative powers of this state shall be vested in the senate and
assembly." Id.
8. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1. This section provides in pertinent part:
"The executive power shall be vested in the governor ....

"Id.

9. Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 784, 652 N.E.2d at 172, 628 N.Y.S.2d at
619.
10. Id. at 784, 652 N.E.2d at 172-73, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 619-20.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 788, 652 N.E.2d at 175, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
13. 66 N.Y.2d 185, 189-90, 486 N.E.2d 794, 797, 495 N.Y.S.2d 936,
939 (1985). In Clark, the court held that the executive order, establishing a
program to increase voter registration by requiring certain state agencies to
make voter registration forms available, did not violate the constitutional
principle of separation of powers. Id. The court reasoned that the executive
order was not inconsistent with the policy of the Legislature, which was to
promote the greatest possible participation in elections, despite the
Legislature's declination to enact legislation that would accomplish
substantially the same result as the executive order. Id.
14. 77 N.Y.2d 340, 569 N.E.2d 860, 568 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1991). In this case,
the court of appeals held that the Public Health Council's adoption of
regulations which required "applicants seeking nursing home approval to agree
that the home will admit a 'reasonable percentage of Medicaid patients' ...
defined as 75% of the rate of Medicaid nursing home admissions in the county
where the home is located" was a valid exercise of the Council's legislative
power, and was not in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers. Id. at 344, 569 N.E.2d at 861, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
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proposition that "[tihe constitutional principle of separation of
powers, 'implied by the separate grants of power to each of the
coordinate branches of government,' requires that the Legislature
make the critical policy decisions, while the executive branch's
responsibility is to implement those policies." 15 Chief Judge
Kaye explained the impossibility of "neatly divid[ing]" the
"duties and powers of the legislative and executive
branches... into isolated pockets." 16 The court further stressed
the difficulty of segregating the governmental branches into
distinct categories, and reiterated Justice Breyer's concurrence in
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,17 which provided that "[the separation
of powers] doctrine does not 'divide the branches into watertight
compartments,' nor 'establish and divide fields of black and
white.'"18 Furthermore, the court reaffirmed the rule announced
in Clark, which provides that "[i]t is only when the Executive
acts inconsistently with the Legislature, or usurps its
prerogatives, that the doctrine of separation of powers is
violated." 19
Applying this rule, the court determined that the executive
order did not act inconsistently with the Legislature nor did it
usurp its prerogatives, but rather that it was merely a means to
promote a "'general' legislative purpose."20 In analogizing the
present case to Clark, the court compared the executive orders at
issue in each case, and concluded that both cases involved the
creation by the governor of an entity other than that intended by
15. Bourquin, 66 N.Y.2d at 784, 652 N.E.2d at 173, 628 N.Y.S.2d at
620.
16. Id.
17. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). In Plaut, the Supreme Court was faced with
the issue of whether section 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act was in
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Id. at 1450.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the section was
unconstitutional because it violated the constitutional separation of powers
doctrine by allowing federal courts to reopen final judgments. Id. at 1463.
18. Id. at 1465 (citations omitted).
19. Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 785, 652 N.E.2d at 173, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 620
(citations omitted).
20. Id. at 786, 652 N.E.2d at 174, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
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the legislature. 2 1 Explaining that "[e]ach of the respective
with the power to
Executive Orders vests a particular entity
promote a broad, even 'general' legislative purpose," 22 the court
23
upheld the order.
The court further found Clark to be similar to the present case
in that in both cases, the Legislature reviewed, but declined to
enact, bills that would achieve the objectives of the respective

Executive Orders. 24 Relying on the reasoning in Clark, the court
agreed that the failure of the Legislature to enact such a bill does

not necessarily indicate that the Legislature disapproved of the
program suggested by the Executive Order. 25 Furthermore, the
court rejected plaintiffs' argument that "such failure should be
26
taken as proof of hostile legislative intent.,

The court relied on Chief Justice Cardozo's explanation in
Matter of Richardson,2 7 when it held that a commonsensical

approach should be taken when evaluating whether there has been
21. In Clark, the executive order in question created the Voter Registration
Task Force. There, the Governor relied on Election Law § 3-102(13) as
authority to create the Voter Registration Task Force, and relied on the
following language, "the state board of elections shall have the power and
duty ...

to encourage the broadest possible voter participation in election."

Similarly, in Bourquin, the Governor found support for the executive order in
article 20 of the Executive Law, which provided that the Consumer Protection
Board may "promote and encourage the protection of the legitimate interests of
consumers within the state." Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 785-86, 652 N.E.2d at
174, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
22. Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 786, 652 N.E.2d at 174, 626 N.Y.S.2d at
621.
23. Id. at 788, 652 N.E.2d at 175, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
24. Id. at 787, 652 N.E.2d at 175, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 247 N.Y. 401, 160 N.E. 655 (1928). Chief Justice Cardozo stated that
"[t]he exigencies of government have made it necessary to relax a merely
doctrinaire adherence to a principle so flexible and practical, so largely a
matter of sensible approximation, as that of the separation of powers." Id. at
410, 160 N.E. at 657. In Richardson, the New York Court of Appeals granted
an order of prohibition commanding the respondent to cease participation as a
justice of the supreme court for the duration of certain hearings and
investigations. Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 787, 652 N.E.2d at 174, 628 N.Y.S.2d
at 621.
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a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 28 The court
adhered to this well settled and long established method of

examining constitutional challenges to the separation of powers
doctrine, and refused to view the Executive Order in isolation,
but instead considered the policy contemplated by the
29
Legislature.

Another factor that the court considered in reaching its decision
was the fact that the Executive Order in question was broadly
drafted, and did not tailor its goals to specific policies. 30 For
example, the court explained that the Executive Order does not
"instruct the CUB to press for lower utility rates or to seek

greater

disclosure

of the

financial

statutes

of

utility

31

Distinguishing the present matter before the court
companies."
from the cases in which this court has struck down executive
orders or administrative regulations, the court explained that the
Matter of Broidrick v. Lindsay,32 Rapp v. Carey,33 Under 21,

Catholic Home Bur. for Dependent Children v. City of New
York, 34 and Boreali v. Axelrod35 line of cases all contained

28. Id.
29. Id. at 786, 652 N.E.2d at 174, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 39 N.Y.2d 641, 350 N.E.2d 595, 385 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976). In
Broidrick, the court struck down an affirmative action program for contracts in
New York City because the city was acting in excess of the authority granted
to it by the Legislature, in promulgating the regulation. Id. at 644, 350 N.E.2d
at 596, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 266. The regulations included specific quotas to be
complied with, instead of a percentage employment formula, which would
most likely have survived constitutional scrutiny. Id.
33. 44 N.Y.2d 157, 375 N.E.2d 745, 404 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1978). In Rapp,
the court of appeals invalidated an executive order requiring various state
employees to file financial disclosure statements and to abstain from certain
political and business activities, as an unauthorized use of executive power. Id.
at 160, 375 N.E.2d at 746-47, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
34. 65 N.Y.2d 344, 482 N.E.2d 1, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1985). In Under
21, Chief Judge Wachtler held that an executive order, issued by the mayor of
New York City, was invalid as it was an unauthorized use of his executive
power. Id. at 359, 482 N.E.2d at 7, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 528. The executive order
prohibited employment discrimination by city contractors on the basis of sexual
orientation. Id. at 353, 482 N.E.2d at 3, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
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"detailed and comprehensive" ' 36 executive orders and regulations
in contrast with the Executive Order in the case at bar, which
does not. 37
The sole dissenter in Bourquin, Judge Smith, agreed with
contention that the Executive Order was
plaintiffs'
unconstitutional because it exceeded the policy of the
legislature. 3 8 Acknowledging that this court has consistently held
that when an action by the executive is merely a means of
implementing a state legislative policy, such action is
constitutional. 39 Judge Smith concluded that the executive order
did in fact violate the principle of separation of powers under the
New York State Constitution because it was in excess of the
legislative policy.40
As Bourquin demonstrates, the demarcation between each
governmental branch is difficult to define. However, as this case
points out, so long as an action taken by one branch is consistent
with the policies contemplated by the other branches, and such
action does not usurp power from another branch, the action
taken will survive constitutional scrutiny under the doctrine of
separation of powers.

35. 71 N.Y.2d 1, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 523 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1987). In Boreali,

the court of appeals struck down a code governing tobacco smoking in public
places, promulgated by the Public Health Council. Id. at 16, 517 N.E.2d at
1357-58, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 472. The court held that the program was in excess
of the Public Health Council's authority as granted by the legislature. Id.

36. Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 787, 652 N.E.2d 174, 628 N.Y.S.2d 621.
37. Id. at 787, 652 N.E.2d at 175, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 622.

38. Id. at 788, 652 N.E.2d at 175, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 622. See Matter of
New York State Health Facilities Ass'n v. Axelrod, 77 N.Y.2d 340, 569

N.E.2d 860, 568 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1991); Clark v. Cuomo, 66 N.Y.2d 185, 486
N.E.2d 794, 495 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1985).
39. Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 793, 652 N.E.2d at 178, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 625
(Smith, J., dissenting).

40. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
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